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Abstract
We will define a new type of cipher that doesn’t use neither an easy
to calcualate and hard to invert matematical function like RSA nor a
classical mono or polyalphabetic cipher.
Our cipher will use an intrinsic and not syntactic property of a se-
quence. The core idea of this cipher is a process that is close to changing
the measurement units of the input sequence.
1 Introduction
As known a cipher is an algorithm that takes as input some binary sequence
and gives back a ciphered sequence as output. This process is supposed to be
simple to compute but difficult to reverse unless the key is known (this is known
as a one way trapdoor mechanism).
The problem of most known ciphers (except the one-time-pad [2][3][7][8]), is
that their ciphertexts preserve some kind of structure which can be used from
some cryptanalyst to obtain the plaintext they originated from.
Many kind of cryptoanalisis use this strategy. Therefor we shall eliminate
this problem. To be uneffected by this pathology we shall mold our cipher
aroud a intrinsect non syntactic property of the information sequences, i.e. its
measurabilty as we will explain.
We are going to define a process (the measurement) that will be something
like a input sequence “weighing“, the ciphertext spawned by our cipher isn’t a
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simple encoding in the classical meaning, but an allocation function of its value,
called from now ∇.
Im going to explain in this article, some possible implementations of this idea.
These implementations will help on clarifying how we use ∇ in our process.
2 The Idea
The property we shall be using in our cipher, is a redefinition of a measure of
the input sequence. To give an idea of what we mean by a measure of sequence
we start with a simple example. The following base two sequence
101000001
is written base ten, giving exponents in reverse sequence, as shown in the
following example:
20 + 22 + 28 = 261.
Now we define ∇ as a set of positive integer such that every element of set
will be smaller than previous and such that last element will be 1.
We call measure by nabla, a set of integer values. The first one is the result
of integer division between decimal value of input sequence and the value of
the first element of ∇. Next value of the set is the result of integer division
between decimal value of the previous element of set ( first one in this istance )
multiplied by the value of the element of ∇ previously used, and so on.
Now, we will be able to define a first cipher pseudo-code.
3 The cipher
To show a first example of how the cipher works, we can propose the pseudocode
below, there we take in input a binary sequence and translate it in its decimal
value. after that we take in input an array of integral value as ∇ and encode it.
The output will be an array of measures by ∇.
Function Cript:
begin
/* plaintext input as decimal value */
Sequence = (int) Input (BinarySequence);
/* input array of ∇ */
Nabla[] = Input (MeasureUnit);
Output[ leght(Nabla) ];
Index = 0;
Forall V alue in Nabla[ ](
Output[ Index ] = Sequence / V alue;
Sequence = Sequence − ((Sequence Mod V alue) ∗ V alue);
Index++;
)
Return Output[ ];
end
Here is the decoding function using ∇
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Function Decript:
begin
InputSequence[ Nabla ] = (int) Input(BinarySequence);
Nabla[ ] = Input(MeasureUnit);
Output[leght(Nabla)];
Index = 0;
Forall V alue in Nabla[ ](
Output[ Index ] = InputSequence[ nabla ] ∗ V alue;
Index++;
)
Return Output[ ];
end
This algorithm is simply to force, but there is a way to emprove this econding.
4 Emprove the security
To emprove the security of this cipher we change something; Let now ∇, DaltaQ
and DeltaR three simple set of N random integer, and let P0 a random integer;
Now we can explain a new cipher.
Function Cript:
begin
/* plaintext input as decimal value */
Sequence = (int) Input (BinarySequence);
/* input array of ∇ */
Int Nabla[] = Input (Setofinteger);
/* input array of DeltaQ */
Int DeltaQ[] = Input (Setofinteger);
/* input array of DeltaR */
Int DeltaR[] = Input (Setofinteger);
/* input P0 */
Int P0 = Input (Integer);
/* Output array with leght of Nabla */
Output[ leght(Nabla) ];
Int Index = 0;
Int Tmp = 0;
Int V alue = 0;
Sequence = Sequence ∗ P0;
for ( Index = 0; Index < lenght( Nabla[ ]; Index++ ) (
Tmp = ( Sequence / Nabla[ Index ] ) ∗ DeltaQ[ Index ];
Output [ Index ] = Tmp;
Sequence = ( Sequnce Mod Nabla[ Index ] ) ∗ DeltaR[ Index ];
Index++;
)
Return Output[ ];
end
How we can see, our algorithm is a simple arrangement of divisions and
subtractions. So it’s really easy to calculate, even if impossible to come back to
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original input. Difficulty doesn’t matter about complexity, but it comes from
the possibility to find a potentially infinite set of significative results by using
wrong ∇, DaltaQ, DeltaR and P0 values.
5 Conclusions
We introduced, in a very informal manner, the notion of measurement by an
allocation scheme and three processes to cipher a sequence. It can be proved
that both ciphers are secure, as long as the key is used only once.
It’s important to say that, we can cipher a ciphered text with a new ∇
improving security.
In next article [1] we going to explain a communication protocol to use this
cipher for secure transfer of data, using only one security key. We will show also
mathematical proof of endurance of this cipher.
See you soon and thanks.
Special thanks to Doctor Luigi Borasi and Doctor Alessandro Bompadre and
Ing. Nicola Papazafiropulos.
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